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Abstract 
Mergers and acquisitions is one of the company strategy to maintain and increase the financial performance, 
growth and diversification. Mergers and acquisitions in this study is a mergers and acquisitions made between 
the company in the same industry. Another goal of this merger or acquisition is the company can survive in a 
fierce business competition, for example, in the Indonesian telecommunications business that  has experienced a 
market penetration over 100% and tends to saturation. Some examples of Indonesian telecommunication 
companies which has done the mergers and acquisitions or being acquired is Telkom Indonesia, Indosat, 
SmartFren and Bakrie Telecom.This study is intended to see the impact of this M&A activity to financial 
performance using some of the financial ratio, MVA, EVA, PER, PBV as the the proxy, DSC and Altman Z-
Score as the proxy of financial distress and market share of these five biggest telecommunication operator in 
Indonesia.The analysis using the paired T-Test shows there are significant differences for ROA and MVA on 
Bakrie Telecom, MVA and the Total Debt to Total Equity Ratio on SmartFren and some financial ratios, EVA, 
MVA, PER and PBV for Indosat and Telkom. The differences of these impacted variables are caused by the 
difference of post mergers and acquisitions duration for each observed company. The results also show that DSC 
as a proxy is more appropriate to describe the financial distress for these five Indonesian companies in 
comparison to Altman Z-Score. This paper also shows no change in market share for these five companies after 
merger and acquisition.      
Keywords: Acquisitions, mergers, financial distress, financial performance 
 
1. Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions is done by various company for various reasons. Some of them are to improve 
company’s financial performance, liquidity, growth and diversification and also to  reduce their  business 
competitors. Improved the financial performance is one of the primary goal of  M&A so that the company could 
still remain active and to strengthen their position in industry. The importance of improving financial 
performance is also be expected to improve the liquidity of the company as well as the value of the company to 
attract the investors. Many research related to M&A has been conducted in many countries  such as Lebudi 
(2010) in South Africa, Refnes (2012) in Europe, Park et al. (2001) in global country, Shin et al. (2005) in USA 
and Mulyana (2012) in Indonesia 
A Business strategy  with mergers and acquisitions does not always manage to increase the value of the 
company and achieve the goals of the stakeholders. In the research conducted by Lebudi (2010) in South Africa 
highlighted the problem of change management in the NHLS (The National Health Laboratory Service) which is 
not successful because the company culture that has not prepared them well from the beginning so the merger 
will inhibit internal and external communications in order to achieve company goals. Park et al. (2001) analyzed 
the market reaction against the merger and acquisition announcements and the results show that this will give a 
negative impact on the market and give the negative effect also on corporate earnings. Mulyana (2012) analyze 
the determinants of M&A and its performance after M&A bank in Indonesia.  
Some of sample for M&A in telecommunication industry are Bell Atlantic in 1993, a phone company in 
USA  trying to merged with TCI, a cable TV company in USA, Telenor and Telia in 1999. In Indonesia, some of 
the M&A sample in telecommunication industry are SingTel acquired 35% Telkomsel since 2001, a subsidiary 
of PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia, Indosat merged with IM3 and Satelindo in 2003, FREN acquired Smart 
Telecom in 2011 and become SmartFren, Bakrie telecom acquired 35% STI in 2012, which has license 450Mhz 
and XL Axiata acquired 100% AXIS in 2013. Research done by Shin et al. (2005) show that one telco company 
acquired the other telco company was much bigger in size. 
Refsnes (2012) doing research on the case of a successful merger and acquisition in the case of the 
merger between Statoil and Hydro in 2007 and merger and acquisition cases that fail i.e. Telenor and Telia in 
1999. The case of the merger between Statoil and Hydro are said to be successful among them because of the 
similarity of the organizational structure and business strategy in common between the two companies. While 
the merger between Telenor and Telia said failed because of a difference in State and corporate culture. Telia is a 
telecommunications company that originated in Sweden while Telenor is a telecommunications company that 
originated in Norway. One of the business policies in the telecommunication sector to strengthen the position of 
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the company is to do mergers and acquisitions within the same sector and it does not always provide a success as 
expected by stakeholders.  
Due to non robust result from all M&A research, it is important to re-examined more for this coporate 
activity impact in its financial performace and finacial distress in Indonesian telecommunication industry.  
This research has some advantages, which are analyze data from Jakarta Stock Exchange,  although, 
research conducted by other researcher such as Pranowo (2012) also used same data source but not in particular 
for M&A in Indonesia telecommunication industry.  
A cell phone user in Indonesia until March 2014 according to the data of Indonesian Ministry of 
communication is approximately 270 million. This amount exceeds the total population of Indonesia, which, 
according to the U.S. Census Bureau is only about 255 million in the same year. This data shows that roughly 
one person has more than one mobile phone number. This data also shows that the market penetration of mobile 
phone users was over 100% and the market, particularly mobile is currently more mature up to tend to the 
saturation and make business competition among operators of telecommunications network provider are 
increasingly fierce. 
Various business strategies are done by telecommunications operators in Indonesia to keep them run the 
business as best as possible, one of its business strategy is mergers and acquisitions between companies in the 
same sector. At first, after the abolition of the telecommunication monopoly law in 1999, Indonesia had almost 
12 Telco operator. Indonesia’s cellular telecommunication currently is dominated by three large operators that 
using GSM technology and two operators that using CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access) technology, they 
are :  
1. Telkomsel, as the subsidiary of PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia, is a GSM operator and 35% owned by SingTel 
which is the telecommunications company from Singapore 
2. PT Indosat, is a GSM operator, 65% of its shares owned by Qtel, telecommunications company from Qatar 
3. PT XL Axiata Group, is a GSM operator and 66,5% is owned by Axiata Malaysia 
4. PT Smart Telecom is a CDMA operator 
5. PT Bakrie telecommunication or known with its products, namely Esia is a CDMA operator. 
Merger and acquisition activity is done with reason to strengthen the position of the company and the 
impact be expected  is an increase in services provided to their user because they also get extra frequency bands. 
This extra frequency band can be optimized to deliver better services to the user  which is be expected to 
increase the benefits for stakeholders as well as the improvement of the financial performance. 
Another impact of mergers, acquisitions and privatization in the Indonesian telecommunications 
operators is the foreign parties that dominate the busniness of telecommunications in Indonesia today. It also 
should be a concern to all parties, the importance of the telecommunications  sector today. Regulatory point of 
view must be considered these matter since telecommunication sector is part of the defense of the country aspect 
due to several cases of intercepts by foreign parties. 
Telecommunication is also used to support financial transactions, this can be seen by the existence of 
several additional payment features that developed by the Telco operator. This is in line with the Government’s 
less cash society program  in 2007. Therefore, some business policy was taken by telecommunications operators 
are not only impact on business itself but also has an impact on Government policy as a regulator.  
Other things observed in this study is financial distress of each observed company as the other aspect of 
their ability  to pay their debt. This information is important not only to their investor but also to internal 
management to anticipate their bankruptcy. Financial  Corporate bankruptcy prediction is the interesting thing 
for researchers to examine more, related models that will be used and also its application in some business 
sectors. Pranowo (2012) made the prediction that the company that has DSC (Debt Service Coverage) ≤ 1.2 were 
on the Financial distress and if the value is above 1.2 then do not experience Financial distress. This model is 
used to examine Indonesia companies listed on the Indonesia stock exchange during the period 2004-2008. Zaki 
et al. (2011) try looking at some of the factors that may affect the occurrence of financial distress in the 
conventional banks and Islamic banks in the United Arab Emirates. The results of his research is that the cost 
income ratio, equity to total assets, total asset growth and credit risk that occurred in the previous year will affect 
the occurrence of financial distress in the following year. Also, Kpodoh (2009) examining the bankruptcy and 
financial distress prediction in the mobile telecom industry in Ghana by using the Z-score and declared the 
existence of the relationship between corporate governance with the financial performance of the company that 
leads to financial distress. 
Soon et.al (2012) examines the 44 companies listed on the stock exchange of Malaysia using Altman Z-
Score method and financial ratios and its stated that the studies developed by Altman (1968) to predict the 
bankruptcy of a company can predict exactly 94% for a year before the bankruptcy case and 72% for the two 
years before bankruptcy occurs. It shows that Altman Z-Score and financial ratios can be utilized as a tool to 
forecast the failure of the company. 
The company's bankruptcy risk can also be seen from the company’s financial performance. One of the 
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researchers is Jung (2007), which stated that the company's financial performance can be viewed from two 
aspects to get more effective results analysis. Those are operational and top management  aspect in financial 
activities using the WACC as a bench mark. One of  research to look at the value of the telecommunication 
company in Indonesia is Arifin et al. (2012) that establishes the value prediction using two approaches, a market 
approach using P/E ratios and an income approach using the cash flow.  
The framework of this study can be seen in figure 1. Financial ratios, PER, PBV, EVA and MVA  are 
analyzed  from the five telecom operators ‘s annual reports and comparing each financial performance before 
and after M&A. This study also calculates whether the company experiencing financial distress or not using 
DSC and Altman Z-Score. We try to figure out whether the merger and acquisition activity impacted the 
company’s fundamental financial performance or not and also to see the risk of bankruptcy Indonesian 
telecommunications operator using the Altman Z-Score and DSC. Both methods are used to see which one is 
more describe the risk of bankruptcy or financial distress of Indonesia's five telecommunications operators.  
 
Figure 1 Analysis Framework 
The paper is organized as follow. Section 2 discussed the data and methodology. Section 3 we discussed the 
empirical result and Section 4 is conclusion of the research.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
The data in this study is using published and audited annual financial statements of 5 Telco operator that listed 
on the Jakarta stock exchanges. The period audited financial statement data used is 1999 to 2013 for Telkom and 
Indosat, while 3 other operators were based on their  IPO year  until 2014. The variables used in our evaluation 
are: 
• Liquidity : this ratio can portray how well the company can deal with their short term obligation 
a. Curent ratio = (Current Assets/Current Liabilities)  
b. Quick ratio = ((Current Assets - Inventories)/Current Liabilities) 
c. Cash ratio = (Cash/Current Liabilities) 
• Profitability : this ratio can describe how effective is the company management using their asset and 
shareholder’s equity to generating income  
a. Return on investment (ROI) = (Operating Profit/Invested Capital) 
b. Return on equity (ROE) = (Net Income/Shareholders' Equity) 
c. Return on asset (ROA) = (Net Income/Total Assets) 
d. Net Profit Margin (NPM) = (Net Income/operating revenue) 
• Solvency: this ratio can can portray how well the company can deal with their long term obligation. 
This ratio can give a better figure before the company entering the financial distress. 
a. Total debt to total equity ratio = (Total Debt/Total Equity) 
b. Debt to Total Asset ratio = (Total Debt/Total Assets) 
c. Debt to Equity Ratio = (Total Long Term Debt/Shareholders' Equity) 
• Measurement of Financial Distress using DSC value and the Altman Z-Score. We use the Altman Z-
Score for non-manufacture company and emerging markets as the following equation (Altman, 2002) : 
Z = 3,25+6.56T1 + 3.26T2 + 6.72T3 + 1.05T4 
T1 = (Current Assets − Current Liabilities) / Total Assets 
T2 = Retained Earnings / Total Assets 
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T3 = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes  / Total Assets 
T4 = Book Value of Equity / Total Liabilities 
And the following threshold for Z-Score :  
Table 1 Z-Score 
Z Predicted 
> 2,6 Non Bankrupt 
1,1 < Z < 2,6 Gray Zone 
< 1,1 Bankrupt 
             DSC = (total net income) / total debt service 
• Company’s value added calculation using : 
a. EVA = EBIT x (1-tax rate) - (total net operating capital) x (WACC)  
WACC = )1( TcKd
ED
D
Ke
ED
D
−
+
+
+
 
Ke = cost of equity 
Kd = cost of debt 
Tc = tax rate 
b. MVA = total market value – total capital 
• Company’s share value calculation using : 
a. PER = Closing price/Earning per share 
b. PBV = Closing price/book value 
The hypothesis in this research is: 
H0: There is no significant difference between (Variable) before and after merger or acquisition 
H1: There is a significant difference between (Variable) before and after merger or acquisition 
The hypothesis are tested using paired T-test equal variance for all above the variable excluding Altman Z-Score 
and DSC. 
 
X = Mean sample X 
Y = Mean sample Y 
Sp = Pooled standard deviation 
n = sample 
 
3. Empirical Result 
3.1. Financial performance each company 
Variable Significantly different 
BTELa FRENb ISATc TLKMd 
Current ratio   X X 
Quick Ratio   X X 
Cash ratio    X 
ROI     
ROE    X 
ROA X   X 
NPM     
Debt to total asset ratio     
Total Debt to Total Equity Ratio   X   
Debt to Equity Ratio   X  
EVA   X X 
MVA X X X X 
PER     
PBV     X   
acalculated using paired T test at, alpha = 5%, using data 2 years before and 2 years after acquisition 
bcalculated using paired T test at, alpha = 5%, using data 2 years before and 3 years after acquisition 
ccalculated using paired T test at, alpha = 5%, using data 2 years before and 10 years after acquisition 
dcalculated using paired T test at, alpha = 5%, using data 2 years before and 12 years after acquisition 
3.1.1. Bakrie Telecom (BTEL) 
PT Bakrie Telecom, Tbk is the FWA (Fixed Wireless Access) operator, which was established in August 13, 
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1993 under the name of PT Radio Telephone Indonesia (Ratelindo) and changed its name to Bakrie Telecom in 
2003 and became operator of CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access) until today , Bakrie Telecom done IPO in 
2006 with the code BTEL in JSE. Statistical test results in table 2 showed that the acquisition of the 35% STI in 
2012, does not give a significant difference in financial performance between before and after acquisition except 
its ROA and MVA. In addition, BTEL also predicted to potentially bankrupt and having financial distress within 
2 years after the acquisition that is starting in 2013. 
BTEL profitability as in Figure 2 has begun to decline since 2011 due to declining net profit up to 
losses and the most experienced decline is ROE in 2012. In this 2012, BTEL does 35% STI’s (Sampoerna 
Telecom Indonesia) stock acquisition. The increase in debt has occurred since 2009. In 2009, BTEL obtain 
additional short-term bank loans of Rp 235 billion. The increase in current liabilities on average reaches up to 
330.8% in 2014. The increase of this current debt further lowered BTEL’s liquidity, while cash obtained from 
customers is decreased. 
 
Figure 2 Profitability BTEL 
BTEL began to do the operational cooperation with FREN in terms of lease network in 2014, expected 
both CDMA operators can rise from adversity as today CDMA operator began to be abandoned by its user and 
more focus as a data service provider which is more dominant compared to voice services and SMS today. Both 
CDMA operators are planning to participate in the 4G services that provide data services with faster data speed.  
Another thing we can see is EVA BTEL, an increase in the proportion of debt in the capital structure 
whiles the proportion of its shares declines due to the deficiency of capital since 2013. This means that since 
2011, BTEL not able to provide economic added value for the investors because the level of the risk is higher. 
This is evident from the increasing number of debt and cannot be paid by its capital. And this condition also 
reflected in PER and PBV, its value also decreasing and PBV value tends to lower than 1.  
During the observation period, BTEL showed poor financial performance and the company does not 
generate added value since EVA and MVA tend to be negative. BTEL largest capital structure is debt. Debt 
restructuring and rights issue used by BTEL to address the financing problem. BTEL do the rights issue in 2012 
and it was also used to finance the acquisition (bakrietelecom.com, 2012). That is why the results of this study 
did not see the BTEL improvement in financial performance due to the acquisition and instead are in financial 
distress for 2 years after the acquisition if we use DSC value interpretation. We cannot using Altman Z-Score 
because the company is not bankrupt yet as predicted by Altman Z-Score. The real difference in BTEL financial 
performance before and after the acquisition may not be felt in the short term due to this action implemented two 
years before the observation. 
3.1.2.SmartFren (FREN) 
SmartFren  is a merger of two telecommunication operators, Smart Telecom and Mobile 8 in 2011 which listed 
on the stock exchange under the name FREN. FREN is the code of Mobile 8 on the JSE which started IPO in 
2006. In 2011, mobile 8 acquired a 99.9% stake Smartel. The impact of this activity is Mobile 8 get additional 
frequency spectrum and operational efficiencies, the merging brand, customer service and other operational 
activities. Both companies have a license to provide CDMA Blackberry services.  
 
Figure 3 Profitability FREN 
FREN’s NPM as seen in Figure 3, the value reach the lowest in 2010 due to its net income decreased 
almost 100% compared to 2009 and its value began to increase again after the merger in 2011 and followed by 
the increasing of net sales FREN. Also in 2011, FREN concentrate on data services and introduce a slogan I hate 
slow. This strategy, manages to increase revenues into around RP 954 billion, which previously was Rp 376 
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billion. Increasing in operating revenues is followed by an increase in operating costs and ultimately make FREN 
still posted a net loss. Their biggest operating expense in operating expenses, maintenance and 
telecommunications services. This increase occurred as a result of consolidation between Mobile 8 and Smartel 
and mostly occurs due to the increase in rental expenses of telecommunications infrastructure space. This is 
reasonable considering the consolidation process between the two companies is still going on. 
Statistical test results in table 2 show that FREN merger activity in 2011 did not give a significant 
difference to the financial performance FREN except MVA and total debt to total equity ratio. FREN's ability to 
pay  its debt decreased in value. Impairment of solvency is largely due to the increase in total debt compared to 
its equity value. An increase in current debt in 2011 largely due to the debt of frequent use and long-term debt is 
more widely used for the purchase of network infrastructure. FREN also estimated  to potentially bankrupt and 
in financial distress within 3 years after the acquisition. There is no formal announcement has been made for this 
company bankruptcy, so we use the DSC as the proxy of FREN financial distress.  
At the beginning of the IPO, the market still reacts positively and appreciate the stock high enough. 
PBV  FREN shows that the market price is almost 3 times the audited book value. In 2011, PBV FREN is 1.8 
which means FREN stock market price is 1.8 times the price book yet because it is not supported by a good 
financial performance which lead  PBV value become less than 1, which means FREN stock market price below 
the price book. 
3.1.3. INDOSAT (ISAT) 
Indosat merged with Satelindo and IM3 in 2003 under the name of PT Indosat and listed on the JSE with name 
ISAT. Indosat is currently the second-largest telecommunications operator in Indonesia after Telkom. 
 
Figure 4 Profitability ISAT 
In 2013, Indosat recorded a net loss of Rp 2.6 trillion. Operating revenues increased, but operating 
expenses increased also causing the  company a loss. Indosat does not distribute dividends in 2014 due to its 
financial performance in 2013. In addition to losses due to the increase in operating expenses as well as a higher 
loss on foreign exchange and it impacted its to financial performance as seen in Figure 4.  Loss on foreign 
exchange in 2013 is Rp 3 Trillion which previously was Rp 789 billion. Indosat relies on an increasing 
proportion of debt in its capital structure which reached 70% in 2013.  
Statistical test results in Table 2 show that the ISAT merger activity in 2003 did not give a significant 
difference to their profitability and solvency before and after the merger activities, but there is a significant  
difference for liquidity, total debt to total equity ratio, PBV, EVA and  MVA. Indosat is never in a state of 
financial distress. 
For older players in telecommunication industry such as Indosat, the impact of the merger can be seen 
in a period of more than 5 years after the activity. Indosat debt level is increasing  and 42.7% are in foreign 
currency,  made Indosat exposed to financial risk when the rupiah depreciation occurs and  its impact is loss  in 
2013. Rupiah’s value stability against foreign currencies plays an important role because almost half of Indosat 
debt is in foreign currencies. So that the increased revenue will be reduced  by increased in  operating expenses 
also. Another  difference that can be felt is the decline in liquidity after the merger because of the increase of 
current debt. MVA also declines as the stock price continues to drop while EVA increases  as operating profit 
also increase despite a decline in net profit. 
Indosat PBV value in 2012 is above the Indonesian telecommunications sector. Investors are still 
willing to buy Indosat’s stock more expensive. This was due to positive financial performance, although the loss 
in 2013. Investor seen this loss only going to happen in the short term because until now, Indosat has not been in 
financial distress. 
3.1.4. Telkom (TLKM) 
Telkom is Indonesia's oldest telecommunications company and is the only telecommunications operator that 
53% owned by the Indonesian government. At first, Telkom is the only telecommunications company Indonesia 
and has the right to provide domestic and international telecommunications services until international 
telecommunications rights given to Indosat in 1980. Telkom as the oldest  players in the telecommunications 
Indonesia until now is still the number one  Indonesia’s telecommunications operator in terms of revenue sharing 
and market share.In 2002, 12.7% of Telkomsel shares bought by SingTel, which is one of the Singapore 
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telecommunications company and until now the majority of Telkomsel  shares as much as 65% owned by PT 
Telkom and 35% owned by SingTel.  
Statistical test results in Table 3 shows that the stock acquisition Telkomsel by SingTel in 2001 give a 
significant difference to the EVA, MVA, ROE, ROA and liquidity before and after the acquisition. Telkom is not 
in a state of financial distress and not potentially bankrupt from 1999 until 2013. The impact of the rising value 
of the EVA's post-acquisition can only be felt after 12 years of acquisition. The difference value of EVA can be 
felt in the long term. Telkom is one example of the increased value of the EVA post - acquisition due to as an 
older player in this industry so it is more stable in managing the business. 
 
Figure 5 Liquidity TLKM 
Telkom ‘s liquidity is decreased after the acquisition of Telkomsel by SingTel since 2001 as seen in 
Figure 5. The increase in current liabilities Telkom is partly in foreign currency. This made Telkom  was 
exposed to the financial risk if Rupiah fell compared to foreign currencies. An increase in cash obtained from 
customers was smaller than the increase in current debt, causing a decrease in the cash ratio Telkom to an 
average of 43.6%. 
3.1.5. XL Axiata (EXCL) 
XL has started operating since 8 October 1996 under the name of PT Excelcomindo Pratama. The initial 
coverage area is Jakarta, Bandung and Surabaya. XL is a subsidiary of TM (Telekom Malaysia) group in 2005 
and IPO with name EXCL. XL is the third largest telecom operator's in terms of revenue share and market share 
after Telkom and Indosat. In 2008, XL AXIATA owned by Axiata group as much as 83.3% and owned by the 
public as much as 33.5% after AXIATA and ETISALAT release some of its shares since 2010 to increase the 
liquidity. Although EXCL having increasing liquidity as seen in figure 6 after acquisition but EXCL still having 
loss income in 2014 due M&A. 
 
Figure 6 Liquidity EXCL 
In 2013, XL acquired AXIS which is also one of the GSM operator in Indonesia. This acquisition cost 
is obtained from the loan agreement with AXIATA Group Berhard which is the majority owner of XL. The 
purpose of this acquisition, according to its annual report in 2014 are CAPEX efficiency, to support government 
programs of the national broadband program and to get additional frequency spectrum capacity.  
XL ‘s PER in 2013 is above PER  sector means that the market expects this acquisition activity will 
give them  a profit so the price tends to be expensive. The same thing happened in its PBV values which is  more 
than 1, means investors are still willing to pay the stock price more expensive than its book value and as shown 
in table 4, XL is not financial distress although XL suffer losses in 2014 estimated as due its acquisition activity 
which give bigger operating expenses compare to last year. Altman Z-Score for XL is bankrupt and we cannot 
use this since no formal bankrupt announcement being made. The statistical test for XL cannot be made due to 
the period after acquisition is only 1 year.  
 
3.2.  Financial Distress 
As we can seen Table 3, is the test financial distress using DSC and Altman Z-Score. Only Telkom and Indosat 
are not in Financial distress although they done the M&A. EXCL having financila distress only in 2007 when 
released the second IDR bonds. Both CDMA Operator FREN and BTEL are in Financial distress after M&A. 
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Table 2 Financial Distress test 
TLKM ISAT EXCL SmartFren BTEL TLKM ISAT EXCL SmartFren BTEL
1999 Not Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Not FD Not FD
2000 Not Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Not FD Not FD
2001 Not Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Not FD Not FD
2002 Not Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Not FD Not FD
2003 Not Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Not FD Not FD
2004 Not Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Not FD Not FD
2005 Not Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Not FD Not FD Not FD
2006 Not Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Not FD Not FD Not FD FD Not FD
2007 Not Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Grey Area Not Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Not FD Not FD FD Not FD Not FD
2008 Not Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Grey Area Not Potentially bankrupt Not FD Not FD Not FD FD Not FD
2009 Not Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Not FD Not FD Not FD Not FD Not FD
2010 Not Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Not FD Not FD Not FD Not FD Not FD
2011 Not Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Potentially bankrupt Grey Area Not FD Not FD Not FD FD Not FD
2012 Not Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Potentially bankrupt Potentially bankrupt Not FD Not FD Not FD FD Not FD
2013 Not Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Potentially bankrupt Potentially bankrupt Not FD Not FD Not FD FD FD
2014 Not Potentially bankrupt Not Potentially bankrupt Potentially bankrupt Not FD FD FD
Z-Score DSC
Year
 
 
3.3. Market Share 
We used the annual report to calculate the numbers of  subscribers for each Indonesian Telco operator to get the 
market share among those 5 companies aseen in table 3. The result shows no difference in the market share 
biggest position in the period  2011 to 214 after all the operator M&A and the order are Telkom, Indosat, XL, 
BTEL and FREN. 
Table 3 Market Share 
Company User  (in Mio) 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
BTEL 14,6 11,7 12,04 11,65 
EXCL 46,4 45,75 60,55 59,64 
FREN 7,6 11 11,3 11,93 
ISAT 51,7 58,5 59,6 63,2 
TLKM (seluler) 107 125,1 131,5 140,56 
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARK 
The impact of these M&A in financial performance and financial distress for the Indonesian telecommunication 
industry is more visible in the long term period after this activity. These M&A activity also reduce their 
competitor number but not change their market since the older player in this industry already stable in their 
operation activity. Same technology also be their biggest consideration when they start to prepare the M&A in 
order to get the efficient operational cost. The biggest financial risk of the Telco operator is the foreign currency 
exchange rate because they spent in USD for CAPEX and get most in Rupiah from their customer. Settling debt 
and improve liquidity should be the focus for telecommunications operators in order to attract more investors in 
this industry. In line with government suggestion, the main reason of these M&A activity is the additional of 
frequency channels and the efficiency of operational activities in order to still be able to survive in this industry. 
These additional frequency channel and license is important to all telco operator to improve their network 
availability to get more customer. So Indonesian government recommends for telecommunication operators to 
conduct the consolidation or merger within the industry. From the government side, it is a prudent step and win-
win solution for the company because the government can do the rearrangement of the existing frequency blocks 
that owned by Telco operator today and the benefit of the operator is additional bandwidth license. This 
additional bandwidth licenses must be fully utilized to improve the quality of service and the number of 
customers. Operational efficiency must be done to avoid the loss to sustain. If enlarging the market share is the 
objectives of the mergers and acquisitions, then the management need to consider since the market is already 
mature.  
DSC value is more appropriate to potray the financial distress in Indonesian telecommunication 
operator since Altman Z-Score cannot predict exactly the bankruptcy for this sector because all those 5 Telco 
still remain operating actively until today.  
Future research can be done to analyze more impact with longer duration after the M&A activity and to 
explore more reason of M&A from non financial point of view. 
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